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THE CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION OF
CERCLA: A SHEEP IN WOLF'S
CLOTHING?
by
Jeffrey M. Gaba* and Mary E. Kelly**
INCE the early days of the modem environmental movement, citizen
litigation has played a central role in shaping and enforcing environ-
mental requirements in this country. Through the use of such provi-
sions as "informer rewards,"1 judicial review under provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act,2 and specific statutory causes of action under
various statutes,3 citizens have not only sought to abate environmental pol-
lution, but also to compel or constrain government action. Congress has
repeatedly recognized the important role that citizens, acting essentially-as
"private attorneys general," play in implementing environmental require-
ments.4 Today, almost every major federal environmental statute has some
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I. Section 16 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 411
(1988), authorized courts to award up to one-half of any fine to be paid to the person giving
information leading to the conviction. See Rodgers, Industrial Water Pollution and the Refuse
Act: A Second Chance for Water Quality, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 761 (1971); Comment, Informer
Fees Under the Refuse Act: Deciding Who Gets What, 5 ENVTL. L. 321 (1975).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-559 (1988). Indeed, environmental litigation helped shape the mod-
em rules relating to standing and judicial review. See, eg., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 730 (1972) (plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because they did not demonstrate that they
would be among the class of citizens injured by a proposed act); Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410-11 (1971) (plaintiffs entitled to judicial review of Department
of Transportation decision because there was no congressional intent to the contrary in the
relevant statutes); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (plaintiffs were "aggrieved" party under relevant stat-
ute thus entitled to judicial review).
3. See infra note 5.
4. The Report of the House Public Works and Transportation Committee, addressing
the need for a citizen suit provision in CERCLA, stated:
CERCLA is one of only two Federal environmental laws which does not con-
tain a citizens suit provision. The other is the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act. Citizens suits provisions have been found to be helpful
both in encouraging diligent Federal enforcement of environmental statutes and
in locating and taking actions against violators of these Acts.
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form of "citizen suit" provision that authorizes legal action by a broadly
defined class of citizens. 5
Until recently, the Comprehensive Environmental, Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act6 (CERCLA or Superfund) stood virtually alone as
the only environmental statute that lacked a citizen suit provision. This ab-
sence was surprising. CERCLA is one of the major federal statutes defining
the requirements for the cleanup of hazardous substances; it is largely
through CERCLA that the government deals with the widespread public
concern about the presence of hazardous wastes in the environment.7 CER-
CLA has become a major aspect of commercial dealings in this country.8
The scope of potentially liable parties under CERCLA is very broad,9 and
cleanup costs routinely range into the millions of dollars.' 0 Thus, the ab-
sence of a citizen suit provision specifically authorizing public challenges to
actions under CERCLA was a major gap in the central role of citizens under
U.S. environmental policy.
Congress responded to this gap in 1986 by adopting a specific citizen suit
provision for CERCLA. In the Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act (SARA) Congress added a new section 310 to CERCLA that au-
thorizes citizen suits against persons violating the requirements of CERCLA
H.R. REP. No. 253(V), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 83, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 3206.
5. See Toxic Substances Control Act § 207, 15 U.S.C. § 2647 (1988); Endangered Spe-
cies Act § 1540(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act§ 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1988); Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act § 105(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1988); Deep Water
Port Act § 16, 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(1988); Noise Control Act § 12, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1988); Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988); Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act § 23, 43 U.S.C. § 1349 (1988).
6. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988)).
7. CERCLA defines the requirements for the cleanup of hazardous substances that have
been released into the environment. Id.; see infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. The
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) defines the requirements for the disposal of
hazardous wastes. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988). RCRA establishes requirements for the
generators, transporters, and facilities that treat, store, or dispose of those wastes and, among
other things, requires the disposal of such wastes in facilities that have received RCRA per-
mits. See generally ENVrL. L. INST., THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ch. 13 (S.
Novick, D. Stever & M. Mellon eds. 1989) (comprehensive discussion of regulations) [hereinaf-
ter PROTECTION]. CERCLA and RCRA interrelate in a complex manner. For example,
RCRA establishes requirements similar to CERCLA for the cleanup of inactive hazardous
waste sites, 42 U.S.C. § 6924(v) (1988), and CERCLA uses some RCRA standards to define
the required level of cleanup of hazardous substances, id. § 962 1(d).
8. See generally J. MOSKOwITz, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND REAL PROPERTY
TRANSACTIONS (1989) (comprehensive review of environmental liability arising from real
property transactions); Marcotte, Toxic Blackacre" Unprecedented Liability for Landowners, 73
A.B.A. J. 67 (Nov. 1987) (comprehensive discussion of landowners' environmental liability).
9. See infra notes 23-42 and accompanying text.
10. See J. ARBUCKLE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 115 (9th ed. 1987) (costs of
cleanup of individual sites on the National Priorities List (NPL) may rise from $9 million
dollars per site to $30-$50 million dollars per site since adoption of SARA); D. HAYES & C.
MACKERRON, SUPERFUND II: A NEW MANDATE ( A BNA Special Report) 13 (Feb. 13,
1987) (costs of $11.8 to $22.7 billion dollars for the cleanup of 1,500 to 2,500 hazardous waste
sites) [hereinafter SUPERFUND II].
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and against the federal government for its failure to perform nondiscretion-
ary duties.11 Although the language of section 310 is similar to the language
in citizen suit provisions of other federal environmental statutes, its effect is
not. While citizen suit provisions under other statutes have given citizens
important tools to challenge private and government actions, 12 section 310
may have only a limited role in implementing the environmental objectives
of CERCLA. The citizen suit provision of CERCLA may prove to be a
sheep in wolf's clothing.
Section 310 may be of limited significance for two reasons. First, although
section 310 authorizes actions against persons violating the requirements of
CERCLA, the statute contains few self-implementing requirements. 13 CER-
CLA, in most cases, requires the cleanup of hazardous substances only after
the government has first issued a cleanup order.14 Thus, in the absence of
prior government action, citizens may not be able to use the citizen suit pro-
vision to compel the cleanup of hazardous substances. Second, although sec-
tion 310 may authorize challenges to government cleanup decisions, section
113(h), which deals with the "timing" of judicial review under CERCLA,
may prevent those challenges from being brought until after the government
has completed the cleanup of a site.15
This Article addresses the role of citizen suits under CERCLA. Section
one describes the basic structure of CERCLA and the citizen suit provisions
of section 310. Section two discusses the scope of section 310 and describes
the possible violations of CERCLA for which a citizen suit may be brought.
Section 310 is likely to be used primarily to challenge whether the govern-
ment's cleanup decisions comply with the requirements of CERCLA.
Section three analyzes the issue of "timing of review" and discusses the
point at which a citizen suit can be brought to challenge the government's
cleanup action. Case law and legislative history clearly indicate that parties
liable for the cleanup of a site may not challenge government cleanup deci-
sions until all or part of the cleanup is completed. 16 A significant issue re-
mains, however, as to whether other citizens, concerned with the adequacy
of the government's cleanup decision, may seek judicial review of the deci-
sion early enough to affect that decision.1 7 This Article suggests how section
11. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act § 206, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613, 1703 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988)).
12. See generally Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, 13 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,309 (1983) (discussing history of citizens suits under environmental
statutes and impact of private enforcement on enironmental law). One report concerning the
extent of citizen suits evaluated over 1200 citizen suits brought under the Clean Air, Clean
Water, and Resource Conservation Acts. See L. JORGENSON & J. KIMMEL, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL CITIZEN SUITS: CONFRONTING THE CORPORATION (A BNA Special Report) 18 (1988)
[hereinafter CrnzEN SUITS]. In the early 1980s, private environmental groups implemented a
coordinated campaign to file citizen suits under the Clean Water Act. See Guida, Dramatic
Growth in Citizen Suits Under the Federal Clean Water Act, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 3, 1984, at 24.
13. See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 129-159 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 112-118 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 119-159 and accompanying text.
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310 can be interpreted to allow effective citizen participation without causing
undue delay in the cleanup of hazardous substances.
I. CERCLA AND CITIZEN SUITS
A. The Structure of CERCLA
CERCLA was adopted in 1980 in response to concerns about abandoned
hazardous waste sites such as Love Canal and Times Beach. 18 CERCLA is
a complex statute that contains a variety of interrelated provisions intended
to ensure the cleanup of hazardous substances in the environment.19 CER-
CLA provides the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with two main
options to ensure the cleanup of hazardous substances.20 First, EPA may
itself, under section 104, clean up a site.21 The money for these cleanups
comes from the "Superfund," a fund of approximately eight and a half bil-
lion dollars created by a tax falling largely on petrochemical companies. 22
EPA is authorized to recoup its expenses and replenish the fund by a cost
recovery action where there has been a "release" of "hazardous substances"
into the environment from a facility. Section 107 defines the group of poten-
tially responsible parties (PRPs), and this group includes the current owner
or operator of the facility, the past owners, transporters who brought the
waste to the site, and the generators who arranged for disposal of the sub-
18. For a review of the limited and confusing legislative history of CERCLA, see 1
ENVTL. L. INST., SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIvE HISTORY xiii-xxii (1982); Eckhardt, The Un-
finished Business of Hazardous Waste Control, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 253 (1981); Grad, A Legis-
lative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1 (1982).
19. For a general review of CERCLA, see J. ARBUCKLE, supra note 10; J. CASLER & S.
RAMSEY, SUPERFUND HANDBOOK (1985); W. FRANK & T. ATKESON, SUPERFUND: LrIGA-
TION AND CLEANUP (A BNA Special Report) (1985); PROTECTION, supra note 7; Comment,
CERCLA Litigation Update: The Emerging Law of Generator Liability, 14 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,224 (1984). For a summary of the changes made by the Superfund Amend-
ment and Reauthorization Act (SARA), see D. HAYES & C. MACKERRON, supra note 10.
20. The Administrator of the EPA has been delegated the President's authority to imple-
ment CERCLA. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 3 C.F.R. 193 (1987) (superseding Exec. Order
No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1981)).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
22. The Hazardous Substance Superfund is established under 26 U.S.C. ch. 98A. Appro-
priation and uses of the fund are specified in § 9611 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988).
For a general discussion of the Superfund tax mechanisms, see Carlson & Bausell, Financing
Superfund: An Evaluation ofAlternative Tax Mechanisms, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 103 (1987).
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stances at the site.23 PRPs are subject to "strict liability,"12 4 and they are
"jointly and severally" liable for all cleanup costs. 25
EPA's ability to recover its costs is subject to certain statutory and regula-
tory restrictions. EPA has promulgated a National Contingency Plan
(NCP) that defines the requirements for a proper cleanup action.26 Addi-
tionally, EPA has published a list of the worst sites in the country, the Na-
tional Priorities List (NPL),27 and EPA can undertake long-term
"remedial" actions in most cases only at an NPL site.28
EPA also has the authority to issue administrative orders under section
106 to compel parties to undertake the cleanup themselves. 29 These section
106 orders are powerful tools. Parties who violate these orders are subject to
civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day30 and treble the amount of the final
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). The class of parties liable as "owners or operators" has
been held to extend to, among others, current owners, lessees and sublessors, successor corpo-
rations, and parent corporations. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043(2d Cir. 1985) (current owners); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, 21
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1577, 1581 (D.S.C. 1984) (lessees and sublessors); United States v.
Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870, 888 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (successor corporations); Note,
Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 986, 990-95 (1986) (discussing liability of parent corporations). Past owners are liable if
they owned the facility at the time of disposal, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988), or if they knew
of the presence of hazardous substances and sold the facility without disclosing this informa-
tion, see Id. § 9601(35)(C). Transporters are in general liable only if they selected the site to
which the substances were transported. Id. § 9607(a)(3). Generators are liable if they "ar-
ranged for disposal" of the substances. Id. § 9607(a)(4); see Baskin & Reed, "Arranging for
Disposal" Under CERCLA: When Is a Generator Liable?, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,160 (1985).
24. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984);
Comment, supra note 19, at 10,225.
25. See, e.g., Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 844-45 (joint and several liabil-
ity found upon facts of case); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1254-
55 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (legislative history and statutory language supports joint and several liabil-
ity); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1338-39 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (congressional intent
mandates joint and several liability). See generally Note, Joint and Several Liability for Haz-
ardous Waste Releases Under Superfund, 68 VA. L. REv. 1157 (1982) (statutory analysis ofjoint and several liability).
26. Section 105 of CERCLA requires EPA to promulgate revisions to the NCP in order
to establish "procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances,
pollutants and contaminants." 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (1988). The portions of the NCP dealing
with the requirements of CERCLA are codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.61-.71 (1988).
Section 107 authorizes EPA to recover only those costs incurred that are "not inconsistent
with the national contingency plan." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
27. The NPL is published separately from the NCP at 40 C.F.R. § 300 app. B (1988). See
42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (1988). As of October 26, 1989, there were 1219 proposed and final
sites on the NPL. 54 Fed. Reg. 43,778 (1989).
28. The NCP expressly provides that "[fund-financed remedial action, excluding reme-
dial planning activities pursuant to CERCLA section 104(b), may be taken only at sites listed
on the NPL." 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(a)(1) (1988). EPA is also authorized to undertake "removal"
actions, which are relatively short-term cleanup actions designed to deal with immediate
threats to human health and the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988). CERCLA pro-
vides that removal actions may not, in most cases, cost more than two million dollars or last
more than twelve months. Id. § 9604(c)(1). The NCP establishes limited circumstances in
which the money and time limitations may be exceeded. 40 C.F.R. § 300.65(a)(3) (1988).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988).
30. Id. § 9606(b)(1).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
cleanup.31 As discussed below, PRPs have almost no opportunity for pre-
enforcement review of these orders.32
CERCLA imposes certain substantive and procedural requirements on
cleanups undertaken or approved by EPA. Section 121 requires that every
cleanup remedy selected: (1) assure protection of human health and the en-
vironment;33 (2) meet all "applicable" and "relevant and appropriate" re-
quirements (ARARs) of federal and state environmental laws; 34 and (3)
permanently and significantly reduce the volume, toxicity, and mobility of
the hazardous substances to the greatest extent practicable. 3"
Additionally, the statute and NCP establish requirements for significant
public participation in selection of the cleanup remedy. 36 The Act requires
EPA to publish notice and a brief analysis of the proposed plan, make the
plan available for public review, and provide a "reasonable opportunity" for
public comment. 37 The notice and analysis must include sufficient informa-
tion to provide a reasonable explanation of "the proposed plan and alterna-
tive proposals considered." 38 The statute also authorizes the award of
"technical assistance" grants to persons affected by releases from an NPL
site.39 EPA issues its final decision setting out the appropriate cleanup rem-
edy for a particular site in a "Record of Decision" (ROD).40
PRPs may also be liable for the costs of cleanup through private cost re-
covery actions. Under section 107(a)(4)(B), private parties who clean up
hazardous substances can bring an action against potentially responsible par-
ties to recover the costs of cleanup that were consistent with the NCP.41
PRPs may themselves bring these actions, which may result in some form of
equitable allocation or action for contribution among the parties.42
B. The Citizen Suit Provisions of Section 310
Section 310 provides that any person may commence a civil action:
1) against any person.., who is alleged to be in violation of any stan-
dard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order which has become
effective... [under CERCLA]; or
2) against the President or any other officer of the United States (includ-
ing the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency and the
31. Id. § 9607(c)(3).
32. See infra notes 112-118 and accompanying text.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (1988).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 9621(b).
36. See generally PROTECTION, supra note 7, at 13-149 to 151 (discussing public participa-
tion requirements of CERCLA).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a)(1)-(2) (1988).
38. Id. § 9617(a)(2).
39. Id. § 9617(e).
40. See ARBUCKLE, supra note 10, at 111-12.
41. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B). For a general discussion of the private right of action under CER-
CLA, see Gaba, Recovering Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs: The Private Cause of Action "
Under CERCLA, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 181 (1986).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988) (provision authorizing action for contribution among
PRPs); Gaba, supra note 41, at 227-30.
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Administrator of the [Agency for Toxic Substances Disease Registry
(ATSDR)] where there is alleged a failure of the President or of such
other officer to perform any act or duty... which is not discretionary
with the President or such other officer. 43
Venue for citizen suits lies in the appropriate district court where the viola-
tion occurred. 44 The court is authorized to order actions necessary to cor-
rect violations and to impose any civil penalties authorized for the
violations.45 Like the citizen suit provisions of other environmental statutes,
section 310 contains provisions requiring notice as a precondition of bringing
a citizen suit,46 and citizen suits may not be brought if the government is
"diligently prosecuting" an action to require cleanup of hazardous wastes.47
Section 310 was added in 1986 after considerable debate in Congress. As
originally reported out of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, the
citizen suit provision, contained in section 207 of House Resolution 2817,
authorized actions against persons alleged to be in violation of the require-
ments of CERCLA and actions to compel the government to perform non-
discretionary duties.48 The House Judiciary Committee, however, amended
section 207 by adding a new provision that would also have authorized citi-
zen suits to abate an "imminent and substantial endangerment to health and
the environment." 49
As discussed more fully below, this amendment was intended to address
weaknesses in the citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) that authorized citizen suits to compel the cleanup of
hazardous or solid wastes that were threatening health and the environ-
ment.50 The Committee also noted that the CERCLA amendment would
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (1988).
44. Id. § 9659(b).
45. Id. § 9659(c).
46. Id § 9659(d)(1). The notification provisions require that the citizen plaintiff provide
notice to the President, the state in which the alleged violation occurs, and to the alleged
violator 60 days before the commencement of the suit. Id. Comparable notice provisions in
other statutes have been found to be jurisdictional prerequisites. See, eg., Halistrom v. Til-
lamook, 26 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1809 (9th Cir. 1987) (60-day notice requirement of RCRA
is jurisdictional), Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985) (RCRA, CER-
CLA, and Federal Water Pollution Control Act notice provisions are jurisdictional). Addi-
tionally, the Supreme Court in part relied on the requirement of providing 60 days notice to
alleged violators for its conclusion in Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Founda-
tion, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 50 (1987), that citizens could not bring actions for "wholly past"
violations of the Clean Water Act. The significance of Gwaltney to citizen suits under CER-
CLA is discussed infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d)(2) (1988).
48. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 107, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2889.
49. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253(111), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3038, 3057. Additionally, the Judiciary Committee provision author-
ized intervention in citizen suits by persons, such as neighbors of a site, affected by a citizen
suit. Id.
50. Under RCRA, citizens may sue to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment
resulting from the release of a "hazardous waste." 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988). CERCLA, how-
ever, deals more broadly with the release of hazardous "substances," and the Judiciary Com-
mittee was concerned that the citizen suit provisions of RCRA did not deal with all of these
releases. The Report of the Judiciary Committee stated that:
One of the main reasons the Committee added this provision to CERCLA is
1990]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43
deal with inadequacies in state nuisance and trespass laws.5
The final bill, as reported out of the Conference Committee, contained
several changes from the House and Senate citizen suit provisions. First, and
perhaps most important, the Conference Committee deleted authorization
for citizen suits for imminent and substantial endangerment.5 2 The Confer-
ence Report also clarified that the President and other officers of the United
States, including the Administrators of the EPA and the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), are subject to citizen suits for
failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty.53 The final bill also precluded
citizen suits in situations where the government was diligently prosecuting a
court action under CERCLA or RCRA.54 Finally, the conference substitute
clarified House and Senate provisions by stating that section 310 does not
affect or otherwise impair the rights of any person under federal, state, or
common law except with respect to the timing provisions of section 113. 55
II. SCOPE OF THE CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION
Section 310 authorizes suits against any person alleged to be in violation
of a requirement of CERCLA or against the government for failure to per-
form any nondiscretionary duty. Notwithstanding this seemingly broad au-
because it is unclear whether citizens can use the citizen suits provision cur-
rently contained in RCRA ... to address all waste site threats .... With this
amendment, plaintiffs and the courts will not have to waste time and resources
in determining that a non-listed substance is a solid waste under RCRA. Citi-
zens should be able to protect themselves from dangerous chemicals regardless
of whether EPA has formally listed the chemical under RCRA.
H.R. REP. No. 99-253(111), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3038, 3057. For a discussion of the relationship between the CERCLA and
RCRA citizen suit provisions, see infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
51. H.R. REP. No. 99-253(111), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. ADMIN. NEWS 3038, 3057.
52. The Conference Report stated:
Under the citizens suit provision of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [also known as
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act or RCRA], any person is author-
ized to seek relief, including abatement, where the past or present handling,
storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste
may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the envi-
ronment. The section being deleted from this citizens suits provision covered "a
hazardous waste disposal site," and thus, its operative effect would have been to
cover only locations already covered under the comparable citizens suits provi-
sion of the Solid Waste Disposal Act. In fact, the Solid Waste Disposal Act
provision applies to a broader range of locations since it applies not only to
hazardous waste disposal sites, but also to sites where solid waste disposal may
present an imminent and substantial endangerment. Thus, because the Solid
Waste Disposal Act provision applies to localities where disposal of solid or
hazardous waste as well as hazardous substances has occurred, this overlapping
provision was unnecessary.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 273-74, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3276, 3366-67. For a discussion of the differences in scope between
the CERCLA and RCRA citizen suit provisions, see infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
53. See H. R. CONF. REP. No. 99-962 at 274, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at
3366-67.
54. Id. The House amendment, which applied this bar when the government had com-
menced and was diligently pursuing an administrative order, was deleted. Id.
55. Id.
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thority to compel compliance with CERCLA, the citizen suit provision may
in fact have only limited applicability. CERCLA has few self-implementing
requirements; virtually no obligations arise in the absence of some prior gov-
ernment order. Thus, there may be few actions that can form the basis for a
citizen suit under CERCLA.
A. Compelling Cleanup of Hazardous Substances
Prior to adoption of the CERCLA citizen suit provision, courts had held
that private parties did not, under CERCLA, have the right to have a court
compel the cleanup of hazardous substances.5 6 One might expect that a citi-
zen suit provision of CERCLA would at the very least authorize actions
against potentially responsible parties to compel the cleanup of hazardous
substances. One would, however, be wrong.
Section 310 only authorizes actions for violations of CERCLA require-
ments, and CERCLA simply does not prohibit the release of hazardous sub-
stances nor, in the absence of a government order, require their cleanup if
released.57 CERCLA certainly does provide authority to assure the cleanup
of hazardous substances. Section 104 authorizes the government to clean a
site and sue PRPs to recover the government's cleanup costs.58 Section 106
gives the government broad authority to seek court orders or issue adminis-
trative orders compelling cleanup.5 9 In the absence of some prior govern-
ment action, however, CERCLA does not contain cleanup requirements that
could form the basis of a citizen suit.
The legislative history of section 310 suggests that Congress did not intend
section 310 to provide a direct action against PRPs to compel cleanup. In
earlier House versions, section 310 expressly authorized citizen suits to abate
an "imminent and substantial endangerment" to health or the environ-
ment.6w This element of the CERCLA citizen suit was deleted in conference
because the amendment, as described in the Conference Report, did not add
to authority already contained in RCRA. 61
Although section 7002 of RCRA does authorize citizen suits to compel
the cleanup of hazardous wastes, its scope is narrower than that of CER-
56. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (D.C. Mo. 1985).
57. The Report of the House Public Works and Transportation Committee, discussing the
need for authority for citizens to abate imminent and substantial endangerments, noted that:
CERCLA, however, contains no general prohibition against the release of haz-
ardous substances. In order to obtain the same legal remedies which are avail-
able under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [which prohibits the
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters without a permit], it is necessary to
add the third element which allows a citizen to bring an action to abate a release
or threatened release of a hazardous pollutant which is presenting an imminent
and substantial endangerment to the public health or the environment.
H.R. REP. No. 99-253(V), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 83, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3124, 3206.
58. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
61. See supra -note 52 and accompanying text.
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CLA.62 CERCLA applies to the release of a hazardous "substance. '63 This
term is defined to include large numbers of substances designated as hazard-
ous or toxic under a variety of federal environmental laws.64 CERCLA is
applicable regardless of whether these substances are wastes or products.65
In contrast, section 7002 of RCRA applies only in the case of the release of a
hazardous or solid "waste." 66 Determination of whether a material is a
waste for purposes of RCRA can involve an extremely complicated assess-
ment of both the type of material and the manner in which it is being
handled.67
In most cases, this distinction should not matter. Hazardous substances
subject to cleanup orders under CERCLA will also constitute hazardous
"wastes" under RCRA. 68 Thus, the RCRA citizen suit provision should be
available to compel the cleanup of hazardous materials spilled or otherwise
released into the environment.
An action to abate a threatened release might, however, raise differences
under CERCLA and RCRA. RCRA would not presumably authorize an
action to abate problems caused by hazardous substances that are not classi-
fied as wastes but may still be released into the environment. For example,
products stored in drums that are likely to leak would not necessarily be the
subject of a RCRA citizen suit. It seems clear, however, that under CER-
CLA the government does have the authority to abate the threatened release
of a hazardous substance in such circumstances. 69 Thus, the RCRA citizen
suit provision does not provide the same scope of coverage that a properly
drafted CERCLA citizen suit provision could provide.
62. Section 7002 authorizes actions against:
any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or past or present
owner or operator of a treatment, storage or disposal facility, who has contrib-
uted or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present
an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988). This section has been used as the basis for actions to compel the
cleanup of hazardous wastes. See CITIZEN SuiTs, supra note 12, at 2.
63. Sections 104 and 106 authorize the action with respect to hazardous substances. 42
U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(1), 9606(a) (1988).
64. Section 101(14) defines "hazardous substance" to include materials designated as haz-
ardous under a variety of other environmental statutes or designated as hazardous under § 102
of CERCLA. Id. §§ 9601(14), 9602(a). Additionally, § 104 of CERCLA authorizes the gov-
ernment to undertake a cleanup action where there has been a release or substantial threat of
release of "pollutants or contaminants" that may present an imminent and substantial danger
to health or the environment. Id. § 9604(a)(1).
65. See Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA., 759 F.2d 922, 927-32 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988).
67. See Gaba, Solid Waste and Recycled Materials Under RCRA: Separating Chaff from
Wheat, 16 EcoLoGY L.Q. 623, 634-40 (1989).
68. For example, secondary materials that are recycled by burning for energy recovery or
applied to the land are classified as solid wastes. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (1988). See Gaba, supra
note 67, at 636-40. In some situations, however, hazardous substances that are released into
the environment would not be classified as wastes. Pesticides are a troubling example. See
Grumbles, Pesticides in Groundwater and Section 106 of CERCLA, 19 Env't Rep. [Current
Developments] (BNA) 281 (June 24, 1988).
69. CERCLA § 106 orders may be issued "because of an actual or threatened release of a
hazardous substance from a facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988).
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There is, however, another possible basis by which a citizen suit could be
brought to compel the cleanup of a site.70 Section 310 authorizes actions
against the government to compel the performance of nondiscretionary du-
ties. If exercise of the government cleanup authority under sections 104 and
106 were nondiscretionary, then citizens could sue to compel the govern-
ment to undertake a cleanup action or issue orders to compel a cleanup.
It seems unlikely, however, that a court would find that the government
has nondiscretionary duties to act under sections 104 or 106. Section 104
provides that the government "is authorized to act" in order to protect
human health and the environment;71 section 106 provides that the govern-
ment "may" seek a court order or issue an administrative order.72 Neither
of these provisions speaks in terms of mandatory actions; neither provides
that the government "shall" or "must" act.73 Although courts have found
nondiscretionary enforcement duties under other environmental statutes,
differences in the language and structure of the other statutes suggest that
courts would be unwilling to find a nondiscretionary duty under
CERCLA.74
Only one court to date has considered whether section 310 authorizes an
action to compel the government to take nondiscretionary enforcement ac-
tion. In Thompson v. Thomas75 the plaintiffs sought an order either to com-
pel EPA to enforce the requirements of CERCLA against the landfill or to
70. Some citizens also have another avenue under CERCLA to ensure the cleanup of a
hazardous waste site. The private cost-recovery action contained in § 107(a)(4)(B) authorizes
citizens to clean up a site themselves and then sue PRPs for reimbursement. Id.
§ 9607(a)(4)(B). This provision, although important, is not a substitute for an action to com-
pel the cleanup of a site. To bring a private cost recovery action, citizens must first have
"incurred" costs of cleanup and face significant uncertainty as to whether they will be able to
recover their expenses. Id.; see Gaba, supra note 41, at 224-31. This provision limits the availa-
bility of the remedy to very few of the citizens potentially affected by the release of a hazardous
substance.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988).
72. Id. § 9606(a).
73. Statutory language that an act "shall" be carried out is generally considered to be
mandatory. See Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947); Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S.
490, 493 (1935).
74. Several courts have found that EPA has a nondiscretionary duty to issue Notices of
Violation or Administrative Orders under the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. See, e.g.,
DuBois v. EPA, 646 F. Supp. 741 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (Clean Water Act); Greene v. Costle, 577
F. Supp. 1225 (W.D. Tenn. 1983) (Clean Water Act); Illinois v. Hoffman, 425 F. Supp. 71
(S.D. Ill. 1977) (Clean Water Act). Many courts have held, however,. that the final enforce-
ment decision is wholly discretionary. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.
1977) (Clean Water Act); Caldwell v. Gurley Ref. Co., 533 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
(Clean Air Act). By contrast, other courts have held that both the decision to find a violation
and the decision to undertake civil enforcement actions are discretionary and thus not subject
to review under citizens suit provisions. See, e.g., South Carolina Wildlife Fedn v. Alexander,
457 F. Supp. 118 (D.S.C. 1978) (Clean Water Act); Wisconsin Envtl. Decade v. Wisconsin
Power & Light, 395 F. Supp. 313 (W.D. Wis. 1975) (Clean Air Act). All of these conclusions
were largely premised on the specific language of the statutes that alternately spoke of actions
that the Administrator "shall" or "may" take. In the absence of some mandatory language, it
is unlikely that courts would have found a nondiscretionary duty to undertake enforcement
actions.
75. 680 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1987).
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"fund a private cleanup of the site."' 76 The plaintiff failed to cite section 310
in its complaint, and although apparently cited to the court, the plaintiff
failed to provide notice as required by the section. The court, without analy-
sis, stated that even if the notice requirement had been met, the plaintiff
would still not have stated a cause of action. 77 The court noted that section
310 only authorized an action to compel performance of a nondiscretionary
duty and found that plaintiff had stated no facts indicating that the EPA had
a mandatory duty to plaintiff under section 310 of CERCLA.78
B. Adequacy of a Government Cleanup Order
Although CERCLA may not have a self-implementing requirement to
clean up hazardous substances, CERCLA does have significant requirements
for an adequate cleanup if undertaken by the government or private parties.
Section 121 of CERCLA spells out very specific requirements that EPA
must meet in selecting an appropriate remedy for cleanup of any given
Superfund site. 79 Additionally, the National Contingency Plan promulgated
by EPA specifies the steps that are necessary to develop and implement a
removal or remedial action.80
These requirements are in many ways the heart of CERCLA. They define
the final level of environmental quality that a cleanup must achieve and the
cost that responsible parties will be forced to bear."' Thus, the availability of
judicial review of government cleanup plans through citizen suits is a criti-
cally important issue to citizens, such as PR.Ps, who are concerned that the
cleanup be as inexpensive as possible, and other citizens, such as neighbors
of a site, who are concerned with the environmental adequacy of the cleanup
plan.
Citizens under section 310 can challenge government compliance with the
substantive and procedural requirements of CERCLA. 82 The legislative his-
tory of section 310 states that it was intended to provide a right to challenge
the adequacy of a government cleanup action.83 Additionally, at least one
76. Id. at 3.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
81. See Comment, Superfund and the National Contingency Plan: How Dirty is "Dirty"?
How Clean is "Clean"?, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89 (1984).
82. Citizens may also have the opportunity to contest the adequacy of a government
cleanup plan in the context of a court's review of a consent decree between EPA and PRPs.
See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-962, 99th Cong., 2d Sss. 224, reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3276, 3317 (Report of the House Conference Committee
describing the stage at which an action under § 310 could be brought to challenge the ade-
quacy of a cleanup under CERCLA); H.R. REP. No. 99-253(111), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 23,
reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3038, 3046 (Report of the House Judici-
ary Committee discussing the timing of challenges to cleanup actions under § 310).
Senator Stafford, a member of the Conference Committee, commented on the role of citizen
suits in ensuring implementation of CERCLA cleanup standards:
A major goal of [SARA] is to establish specific, uniform national health stan-
dards that will apply to cleanup decisions at Superfund sites .... The standards
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court has sustained a challenge under section 310 to a completed phase of a
government cleanup plan.84 Thus, section 310 does provide some substan-
tive right of judicial review.
The significance of this right, however, is dependant on the timing of chal-
lenge to the government cleanup decisions. Citizens, even in the absence of
section 310, would have the right to challenge final government cleanup ac-
tions. PRPs can challenge the cleanup plan when the government sues them
in a cost recovery action.8 5 Other citizens may be able to challenge a
cleanup simply as a violation of federal law.8 6 Section 310 is meaningful
only if it allows challenge to the adequacy of the cleanup plan prior to imple-
mentation of the plan. As discussed below, however, the judicial review pro-
visions of CERCLA contain significant limits on the timing of challenges to
government cleanup plans.87 Thus, any judgment as to the substantive sig-
nificance of section 310 requires resolution of the timing issues discussed in
section three below.
C. Notification of the Release of a Hazardous Substance
Perhaps the only self-implementing requirement of CERCLA is the obli-
gation to report the release of a hazardous substance. Section 103 of CER-
CLA requires "any person" in charge of a facility to notify the National
Response Center in the event of a release of a reportable quantity of hazard-
ous substances."8 Thus, section 310 may authorize citizen suits for a viola-
contained in the bill establish a series of non-discretionary, minimum require-
ments which all Superfund responses must meet in order to assure the protec-
tion of human health and the environment. While the conferees fully expect
officials of the Environmental Protection Agency and others to adhere to these
standards, past experience has demonstrated that enforcement of such legal re-
quirements by affected citizens' groups-acting as private attorneys general-is
an essential component in the implementation of any such detailed statutory
mandate. For this reason, section 206 of the bill establishs [sic] an independent
citizens' suit provision under any [sic] section 310 of the act.
132 CONG. REc. S14898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986).
84. See United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 669 F. Supp. 672, 681 (D.N.J. 1987).
85. Parties are liable only for government expenses that are "not inconsistent" with the
NCP. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988). As the court noted in Lone Pine Steering Comm. v.
EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1985), "[s]ection 9607 provides an adequate opportunity for
the alleged responsible parties to object to the cost and adequacy of response actions."
86. The requirements of a cleanup are defined by statute and regulation, see supra notes
33-40 and accompanying text, and presumably violations of these requirements would give rise
to jurisdiction as a "federal question." Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(A), 94 Stat. 2369 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988)). Process of judicial review would be governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 1 Stat. 2728 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1988)). This Act has been the basis for raising challenges to government actions
under the environmental laws for which there are no specific provisions for citizen suits or
judicial review. See, e.g., Orleans Audubon Soc'y v. Lee, 742 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1984) (review
under Administrative Procedure Act of alleged violations of Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act); Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 714 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1983) (al-
leged violations of River and Harbour Appropriations Act reviewed under Administrative
Procedure Act).
87. See infra notes 108-159 and accompanying text.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (1988). Under EPA regulations owners or operators are required
to notify the National Response Center if they have knowledge of the release of a "reportable
quantity" of a hazardous substance within a twenty-four-hour period. 40 C.F.R. § 302.6
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tion of this requirement of CERCLA.
There is, however, a problem with the use of citizen suits to enforce the
notification requirements of section 104. At least one court has held that
citizen suits under section 310 may not be brought for "wholly past" viola-
tions of CERCLA. In Lutz v. Chromatex89 sixty-six plaintiffs, who were
exposed to hazardous substances allegedly released into their groundwater
by the defendants, filed complaints claiming a variety of violations under
CERCLA, RCRA, and state common law. One count brought under the
citizen suit provision of CERCLA alleged violations of the reporting require-
ments of section 103. The court, relying on Gwaltney ofSmithfield v. Chesa-
peake Bay Foundation,90 held that citizen suits under CERCLA could not be
brought for wholly past violations. 9' Following the Supreme Court's analy-
sis in Gwaltney, the court held that its conclusion was mandated by several
factors. First, the "present tense" of section 310 authorizing citizen suits
against persons alleged "to be in violation" of CERCLA implied that only
current violations were subject to citizen suits.92 Second, the notice require-
ment of the citizen suit implied that suits could only be brought for current
violations since the purpose of notice is to give an alleged violator time to
come into compliance. 93 Finally, the legislative history of CERCLA sug-
gested that the purpose of the citizen suit provision was to aid in bringing
violators into compliance and not to provide damages to plaintiffs. 94 Given
Gwaltney, the court's analysis is arguably correct.95
If other courts impose a Gwaltney requirement on citizen suits under
CERCLA, actions for violation of the notice provision of 103 will be sub-
(1988). EPA has promulgated reportable quantities for 721 hazardous substances. Id.
§ 302.2. In the absence of a promulgated reportable quantity, CERCLA provides that the
reportable quantity shall be one pound. 42 U.S.C. § 9602(b) (1988). Reporting is only re-
quired under § 103(a), however, when the owner or operator has "knowledge" of the release of
a reportable quantity. Id. § 9603(a). It is unclear, however, what level of knowledge is required
to trigger this reporting requirement.
89. 718 F. Supp. 413 (M.D. Pa. 1989).
90. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
91. Lutz, 718 F. Supp. at 420-22.
92. Id. at 421.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 421-22.
95. There are, however, problems with the court's analysis. First, the opinion is premised
on the view that the purpose of the notice provision is to give violators time to come into
compliance. Id. There is, however, some indication that Congress did not intend to give viola-
tors of hazardous waste requirements an opportunity to correct their violations before they
could be sued. In the 1980 amendments td RCRA, which were never mentioned by the
Supreme Court, Congress amended RCRA to clarify that government enforcement actions
could be brought without first issuing a compliance order. 42 U.S.C. § 6828 (1988) (amended
§ 3008, Oct. 21, 1980); see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-1172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5019, 5035. Further, the Lutz court's use of
SARA's legislative history is, on its face, inapposite. The court quotes legislative history sug-
gesting that the citizen suit provision was intended to correct violations and not provide for
recovery of damages. Lutz, 718 F. Supp. at 421. It is clear that the citizen suit provision does
not authorize recovery of personal damages suffered by plaintiffs. It is equally clear that the
provision authorizes courts to impose civil penalties payable to the government. The Lutz




stantially restricted. Nonetheless, even with a Gwaltney requirement, citi-
zens may be able to bring citizen suits based on alleged failure to satisfy the
reporting requirements of CERCLA. On-going and never reported releases
of a reportable quantity of a hazardous substance may constitute continuous
violations of CERCLA. Further, CERCLA imposes a limited obligation to
report continuous releases of hazardous substances even after initially re-
ported. 96 Thus, neighbors faced with continuing contamination from a site
may be able to obtain a federal forum by alleging ongoing violations of the
notice requirement.97
D. Preparation of a Risk Assessment by the ATSDR
One interesting aspect of CERCLA is the role of the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) in the development of toxicologi-
cal profiles of substances frequently found at Superfund sites and risk assess-
ments of Superfund and other sites.98 The ATSDR, located within the
Public Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services,
was established by CERCLA in 1980.99
96. Section 103(f) provides that notification is not required for a continuous release, sta-
ble in quantity and rate, if notification has been given under § 103(a) for a "period sufficient to
establish the continuity, quantity, and regularity" of the release. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(f) (1988).
In the case of such a continuous release, however, notification must be given annually or when
there has been a statistically significant increase in the quantity of a hazardous substance above
that previously reported or occurring. Id.
EPA has not promulgated regulations implementing this "continuous reporting" require-
ment. The Agency first requested comments on a proposed rule in May 1983. EPA recently
published a new request for comments on this issue. 53 Fed. Reg. 12,868 (1988). EPA has
stated that until it promulgates a final regulation, persons are to be governed by the language
of the statute. Id.
97. It is not completely clear whether courts may impose penalties for past violations after
jurisdiction has been established based on current violations. See Chesapeake Bay Found. v.
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'g 688 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Va.
1988) (Fourth Circuit reverses district court conclusion that penalties may be imposed for
wholly past violations); Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace,
Inc., 684 F. Supp. 115 (D.NJ. 1988) (court may impose penalties for past violations of expired
NPDES permit if permit conditions have been continued into current permit).
98. See generally Johnson, Health Effects of Hazardous Wastes" The Expanding Functions
of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,132 (1988) (ATSDR works closely with EPA in removing hazardous substances from the
environment and preventing adverse human health effects). In a recent article, a former attor-
ney for the ATSDR discusses the actual impact of ATSDR toxicological profiles on CERCLA
site cleanup and toxic tort litigation. Siegel, Integrating Public Health Into Superfund: What
Has Been the Impact of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry?, 20 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,013 (1990). The author notes that there have been no citizen suits
filed to date to compel the ATSDR to perform nondiscretionary duties, but states that the
failure of the ATSDR to meet health assessment deadlines means that "ATSDR's vulnerability
to possible citizen suits in this area will increase." Id. at 10,018. Additionally, the author
describes the limited use of toxicological profiles in litigation involving CERCLA site cleanup
and notes that the effect of the toxicological profiles on toxic tort litigation has been minimal.
He states that "the expectations that ATSDR activities would greatly aid the work of plaintiffs
in toxic tort litigation have not materialized," but he notes that the role of ATSDR in toxic
tort litigation may increase. Id. at 10,018-19.
99. The ATSDR apparently got off to a slow start when established following the adop-
tion of CERCLA in 1980. In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Heckler, 13 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,630, 20,630 (D.D.C. 1983), the court approved a consent decree resolving
1990]
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Under section 104(i) of CERCLA, the ATSDR is required to prepare,
under strict deadlines, a list of hazardous substances commonly found at
Superfund sites and a toxicological profile of each listed substance. 0° The
profile is to include an examination of all available toxicological and epide-
miological information on the substance to identify levels of significant
human health exposure to the substance.""1 Additionally, the profile must
identify whether additional testing is needed to evaluate adequately the tox-
icity of a hazardous substance.10 2 The statute requires the ATSDR to assure
the initiation of a program of research to determine the health effects of
substances for which adequate information is not available.103
Additionally, CERCLA requires the ATSDR to perform "health assess-
ments" for each facility on the National Priorities List."°4 The statute also
provides that the ATSDR may perform health assessments at facilities not
on the NPL where individuals provide information that people have been
exposed to a hazardous substance released into the environment from a facil-
ity.10 5 These health assessments are to assess the potential risk to humans
from the release of a hazardous substance and are based on such 'factors as
the extent of contamination, the pathways of exposure, expected long and
short-term effects, and recommended or tolerance limits of exposure. 0 6
These provisions impose a variety of mandatory and discretionary duties
on the ATSDR. Section 310 is certainly available to compel the Administra-
tor of the ATSDR to perform nondiscretionary duties such as the listing of
substances, development of guidelines, preparation of toxicological profiles,
and health assessments at Superfund sites. Additionally, citizen suits may
enable citizens to challenge the substantive adequacy of health assessments
and the decisions to develop health assessments at non-Superfund sites to the
extent that citizens can claim that the decisions violate the substantive re-
quirements of CERCLA.
The availability of citizen suits to compel and review action by the
litigation brought by a variety of litigants to compel the ATSDR to comply with its mandatory
duties under CERCLA § 104(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (1988).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(2) (1988). CERCLA, as amended by SARA, establishes certain
requirements for EPA and ATSDR with regard to hazardous substances that are most com-
monly found at facilities on the CERCLA National Priorities List (NPL). Section 104(i)(2) of
CERCLA requires that the two agencies prepare a list of at least 100 hazardous substances, in
order of priority, that are most commonly found at NPL facilities and that the agencies deter-
mine are posing the most significant potential threat to human health. Id. The agencies com-
plied with that requirement with the publication of the priority list of 100 substances. 52 Fed.
Reg. 12,866 (1987). Section 104(i)(2) of CERCLA also requires the agencies to revise the
priority list no later than October 17, 1988. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(2) (1988). Such revision shall
include, in order of priority, the addition of 100 or more such hazardous substances. Id. The
revised priority list containing an additional 100 substances and a summary of the procedure
used to assemble the list was published on October 20, 1988. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,280 (1988).
ATSDR has also announced the expected availability of toxicological profiles of an additional
twenty-five substances. 53 Fed. Reg. 51,192 (1988).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(3) (1988).
102. Id. § 9604(i)(5).
103. Id.
104. Id. § 9604(i)(6)(A).
105. Id. § 9604(i)(6)(B).
106. Id. § 9604(i)(6)(F).
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ATSDR may be of considerable potential significance. First, the assess-
ments are a significant component of remedial decisions made by EPA at a
given site; thus, the ability to compel and review assessments may be impor-
tant in supervising the cleanup decisions made by EPA. Second, the infor-
mation supplied by ATSDR has the potential to be an important aspect of
private tort actions brought by persons exposed to releases of hazardous sub-
stances. The toxicological information developed by the ATSDR is relevant
to the difficult causation questions raised in toxic tort actions.107 Thus, the
CERCLA citizen suit provision may provide a vehicle for private plaintiffs
to compel the government to prepare vital and expensive information neces-
sary to prove successfully the elements of a tort claim.
III. THE TIMING OF REVIEW OF CITIZEN SUITS CHALLENGING
GOVERNMENT CLEANUP DECISIONS
Perhaps the most crucial issue under section 310 is the ability of citizens
to challenge the adequacy of government cleanup plans. Although section
310 does authorize such suits, 108 real questions exist as to whether citizens
can bring the actions early enough to influence effectively the final decisions.
This issue is now controlled by section 113(h), the "timing of review" provi-
sions of CERCLA.10 9 Under section 113(h)(4), courts do not have jurisdic-
tion to review removal or remedial actions of the administrator or section
106 cleanup orders except for, among other things,
an action under section 9659 of this title (relating to citizen suits) alleg-
ing that the removal or remedial action taken under section 9604 of this
title or secured under section 9606 of this title was in violation of any
requirement of this chapter. Such an action may not be brought with
regard to a removal where a remedial action is to be undertaken at the
site. 110
This language limits the review of EPA decisions until after completion of
some action.
Section 113(h) raises important issues. The provision was adopted in the
1986 SARA amendments and has its origins in earlier court decisions hold-
ing that PRPs could not delay implementation of cleanup actions by chal-
lenging the EPA's plan. 1 ' As discussed below, citizens other than PRPs
may have a broader right to bring early challenges to the cleanup plan.
A. Applicability of Section 113(h) to Potentially Responsible Parties
CERCLA was Congress's response to the problem of the cleanup of haz-
ardous substances in the environment, and its broad remedial objectives have
107. For a general discussion of toxicological information in tort litigation, see In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); M. DORE, LAW OF Toxic
TORTS § 26.02 (1989).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (1988).
109. Id. § 9613(h).
110. Id. § 9613(h)(4) (emphasis added).
111. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253(111), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3038, 3045.
1990]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
led courts to conclude that its primary objective is the "prompt cleanup of
hazardous waste sites." 1 2 Pre-enforcement review by responsible parties
would act to delay implementation of the cleanup," 3 and, consistent with
this concern, virtually every court that has considered the issue has con-
cluded that CERCLA precludes pre-enforcement review of agency decisions
by potentially responsible parties. 14 Congress recognized it was codifying
existing case law through the adoption of section 113(h). 115
Courts and Congress have recognized that limiting PRPs' rights of review
until after a cleanup has been completed does not unduly prejudice their
interests. 16 In virtually all cases, PRPs are concerned not with the environ-
mental adequacy of a cleanup, but with the cost of cleanup that they will be
required to bear. Post-cleanup review or review in enforcement actions,
while not ideal from the PRPs' perspective, does provide a mechanism that
responds to these concerns. Responsible parties can challenge the amount of
money they must pay in a government cost recovery action by claiming that
the cleanup plan did not comply with the requirements of CERCLA. 117
Parties also may be able to defend an action for violation of a section 106
order by alleging that the order did not comply with CERCLA require-
ments."l 8 Thus, limitation of PRPs' rights of pre-enforcement review serve
both the statutory objective of rapid and environmentally sound cleanups
and the responsible parties' concern with limiting the expense of cleanup
that they must pay.
SB. Applicability of Section 113(h) to Other Citizens
Although limitation of pre-implementation review of cleanup plans by re-
sponsible parties serves to satisfy both the objectives of CERCLA and the
PRPs, the same is not true of limiting pre-implementation review by citizens
concerned with the environmental adequacy of the cleanup plans. PRPs can
always have their monetary liability reduced if the government plan is in
112. Walls v. Waste Resources Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985).
113. One court noted that "[t]o introduce the delay of court proceedings at the outset of a
cleanup would conflict with the strong congressional policy that directs cleanups to occur prior
to a final determination of the partys' [sic] rights and liabilities." Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett,
800 F.2d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 1986).
114. See Dickerson v. EPA, 834 F.2d 974, 977-78 (11th Cir. 1987); Barnes v. U.S. Dist.
Court, 800 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1986); Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 314-15 (2d
Cir. 1986); Wheaton Indus. v. EPA, 781 F.2d 354, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1986); Lone Pine Steering
Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 885-88 (3d Cir. 1985); J.V. Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263,
264-65 (6th Cir. 1985).
115. Provisions of § 113 that limit pre-enforcement review of cost recovery actions and
enforcement of 106 orders "reiterate the current ability of affected parties to obtain review of
the Administrator's selection of response actions . . . ." H.R. REP. No. 99-253(111), 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3038, 3045.
116. In Cabot Corp. v. EPA, 677 F. Supp. 823, 828-29 (E.D. Pa. 1988), the court wrote
that "[d]ue process rights of PRPs are protected by PRPs' eventual opportunity to contest
unnecessary costs that EPA attempts to recover from them." See Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett,
800 F.2d.310, 314-16 (2d Cir. 1986); Lone Star Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 887 (3d
Cir. 1985).
117. See supra note 85.
118. See Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 316 (2d Cir. 1986).
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error. Judicial review of the environmental adequacy of a plan after it has
been completed, however, is of limited significance. At that point an effec-
tive remedy might require redoing a Superfund cleanup. Such a remedy, if
not impossible, would likely result in an enormous expense. The only time
in which review of a cleanup decision can sensibly take place is after the plan
is developed but before it is implemented.
Although such challenges could delay the implementation of the final
cleanup, they would help ensure that the cleanup is consistent with the
objectives of CERCLA: that cleanups protect public health and the environ-
ment and provide, to the greatest extent possible, a permanent solution to
the release of hazardous substances at a site.1 9 There is substantial reason
to think that the supervision provided by citizen suits is necessary to ensure
proper cleanup of Superfund sites. For example, the federal Office of Tech-
nology Assessment has reported that EPA was inconsistently implementing
the cleanup requirements added by SARA in 1986.120 This inconsistency
was especially true with respect to the requirement of section 121 that pref-
erence be given to permanent treatment of hazardous substances. 121 Addi-
tionally, Congress itself has recognized the need for proper supervision of
EPA's cleanup decisions. Section 122(d) requires, in most cases, public com-
ment and court approval of consent decrees between EPA and PRPs dealing
with remedial actions.122
Resolving the issue of citizen challenges to government cleanup plans is
difficult. The plain language, legislative history, and case law on this issue
are all ultimately ambiguous. Nonetheless, as discussed below, it may be
possible to resolve the problem of minimizing unnecessary delays in govern-
ment cleanup actions while still providing citizens a meaningful opportunity
to present legitimate challenges under section 310.
119. For a discussion of CERCLA's substantive requirements for the cleanup of a site, see
infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
120. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ARE WE CLEANING UP?: 10 SUPERFUND
CASE STUDIES 1-4 (June, 1988)[hereinafter OTA REPORT].
121. Id.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d) (1988). Courts have recognized their authority to engage in a
substantive review of the proposed cleanup plan. See generally United States v. Conservation
Chem. Corp., 681 F. Supp. 1394 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (discussing standards for review of pro-
posed consent decree in CERCLA action and reviewing propriety of specific cleanup proposals
contained in proposed consent decree); United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., 30 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1361 (F.D. Mich. 1989) (cleanup plan complies with state antidegradation re-
quirement and selection of cleanup remedy is not arbitrary and capricious). The extent to
which courts will allow intervention by citizens in proceedings involving review of a consent
decree or the extent to which the court will consider comments submitted on the consent
decree remains to be seen. See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor: Proceedings re
alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (D. Mass. 1989) (allowing intervention by
environmental group in action for court approval of proposed consent decree for purposes of
arguing, among other things, legal requirements of consent decree and legal requirements for
cleanup under CERCLA). Indeed, review of consent decrees may become the most significant
vehicle for reviewing the substance of a cleanup plan. Through SARA, Congress provides
significant incentives to PRPs to enter settlement agreements with the government. Settling
parties, for example, can receive covenants not to sue by the government, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)
(1988), and protection from contribution action by nonsettling parties, id. § 9613(f)(2). Given
these incentives, future CERCLA cleanups are likely increasingly to involve settlement agree-
ments for which court approval will be required.
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L The Language of Section 310
The plain language of section 113(h)(4) does not suggest that environmen-
tally concerned citizens are to be treated any differently from potentially
responsible parties. That section simply provides that "an action" under
section 310 challenging the adequacy of a cleanup plan or cleanup order
cannot be brought until action is "taken" or "secured." 123 The past tense
used for "taken" or "secured" indicates Congress's intention to limit review
until after some action has been completed. 124 At least one court has relied
on this "plain language" argument to find that citizens may not bring an
action challenging a government cleanup plan. 25
The plain language of section 113(h) does not itself resolve the issue of
whether citizens may seek pre-implementation review of a cleanup plan.
Section 113(h) limits review to actions that have been "taken" or "secured"
and the question remains as to whether development of a final cleanup plan
constitutes action "taken" for purposes of review by citizens concerned with
the environmental adequacy of the decision. Some courts, noting the ambi-
guity of the provision, have concluded that the plain language of the statute
does not resolve the issue.126
2. Legislative History
The issue of citizen groups' ability to undertake an early challenge to gov-
ernment cleanup decisions was the subject of considerable discussion in the
legislative history. It seems clear that a challenge cannot be brought until
some action has been taken or secured. 127 The Report of the House Judici-
123. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4) (1988).
124. See Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989).
125. Id. at 1560. This case involved a challenge by the state of Alabama to EPA's decision
to import into Alabama contaminated wastes from a Superfund site in Texas. This case raised
the classic "NIMBY" (Not in My Back Yard) concerns that Alabama was acting not because
of concerns about the propriety of the cleanup decision but simply to protect its parochial
interests. See infra notes 150-159 and accompanying text for a discussion of possible limita-
tions on challenges by citizens raising NIMBY concerns.
126. See, eg., Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v. Reilly, 716 F. Supp. 828 (D.N.J.
1989) (although the statutory language clearly states that review is unavailable until action is
taken, the provision is not entirely clear about what constitutes action taken); Frey v. Thomas,
28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1660, 1662 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (statute does not define when citizen
may bring suit); Schalk v. Thomas, 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1655, 1656-57 (S.D. Ind. 1988)("finding that the statute is not entirely clear about just when in the course of a remedial action
a citizen's suit may be brought, the court will look to the legislative history of this section").
127. The Conference Committee Report, describing the nature of the action that must be
taken before judicial review, states:
In new section 113(h)(4) of the substitute, the phrase "removal or remedial ac-
tion taken" is not intended to preclude judicial review until the total response
action is finished if the response action proceeds in distinct and separate stages.
Rather an action under section 310 would lie following completion of each dis-
tinct and separable phase of the cleanup. For example, a surface cleanup could
be challenged as violating the standards or requirements of the Act once all the
activities set forth in the Record of Decision for the surface cleanup phase have
been completed .... Any challenge under this provision to a completed stage of
a response action shall not interfere with those stages of the response action
which have not been completed.
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ary Committee was explicit that citizens could not challenge the contents of
a cleanup plan until after action had been taken, and the Report implies that
this is not until after a plan has actually been implemented. 12
This position, while sensible with respect to challenges by PRPs, would
limit the effectiveness of challenges to the environmental adequacy of the
cleanup plan. Some legislators, recognizing this problem, indicated that sec-
tion 113 did not limit pre-implementation challenges to the environmental
adequacy of a cleanup plan. Representative Roe, a member of the Confer-
ence Committee, stated that citizens could bring an action as soon as the
agency announces its decision regarding the structure of a cleanup.' 29 This
position was supported by other legislators including Senator Stafford, also a
member of the Conference Committee.' 30 Furthermore, both Representa-
tive Roe and Senator Stafford indicated that courts should draw a distinction
between actions by PRPs and "legitimate" citizen suits challenging illegal
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 224, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 3276, 3317.
128. I The report stated:
This provision [section 113] is not intended to allow review of the selection of a
response action prior to completion of the action: the provision allows for re-
view only of an "action taken"... (italics added). Thus, after the [Remedial
Investigation Feasibility Study] has been completed, the remedial action has
been selected and designed, and the construction of the selected action has be-
gun, persons will be able to maintain suit to ensure that a specific on-the-ground
implementation of the response action is consistent with the requirements of the
Act. For example, a suit under this provisions [sic] may be appropriate where a
specific aspect of the remedial action, which has been taken, in fact fails to attain
a standard required under this Act. The Committee emphasizes that this para-
graph is not intended to allow delay of the clean-up and that, in actions under
this paragraph, courts should not entertain claims to re-evaluate the selection of
remedial action. Also, in reviewing actions under this subsection, the courts
should use their powers to ensure that such review does not disrupt clean-up
remedies.
H.R. REP. No. 99-253(111), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3038, 3046 (emphasis in original).
129. 132 CONG. REc. H9600 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986). Representativee Roe stated:
One of the most important issues addressed by the legislation is the timing of
citizens' suits challenging illegal EPA decisions. Such suits would involve alle-
gations that the agency has violated the cleanup standards and other require-
ments of the law and that a citizen's health and environment would be
threatened if the agency was allowed to continue with its illegal acts.
The legislation allows citizens to bring a lawsuit under section 310 as soon as
the agency announces its decision regarding how a cleanup will be structured.
A final cleanup decision, or plan, constitutes the taking of action at a site, and
the legislative language makes it clear that citizens' suits under Section 310 will
lie alleging violations of law and irreparable injury to health as soon as-and
these words are a direct quote---"action is taken."
It is crucially important to maintain citizens' rights to challenge agency ac-
tions, or final cleanup plans, before such plans are implemented because other-
wise the agency could proceed in blatant violation of the law and waste millions
of dollars of Superfund money before a Court had considered the illegality.
130. Senator Stafford also explained that "[ilt is crucial, if it is at all possible, to maintain
citizens' rights to challenge response actions, or final cleanup plans, before such plans are
implemented even in part because otherwise the response could proceed in violation of the law
... ." 132 CONG. REc. S14,898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986).
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actions by the government. 31 Thus, many of the legislators directly in-
volved in the adoption of section 310 stated that the preparation of a final
cleanup plan constituted a final action subject to review by citizens challeng-
ing its environmental adequacy. 132
Statements of other legislators, however, directly contradict the interpre-
tation of Senator Stafford and Representative Roe. Representative Glick-
man, directly responding to Senator Stafford's remarks, stated that section
113(h) was intended to prevent neighbors, unhappy with a cleanup plan, to
delay cleanup through litigation. 33 Statements of other legislators also sug-
gest that section 113 precludes any pre-implementation review of govern-
ment cleanup plans.' 34
3. Case Law
Faced with ambiguous language and conflicting legislative history, courts
have split over whether citizens, other than PRPs, can challenge the ade-
quacy of a final cleanup plan. At least two courts have indicated that citi-
zens' suits challenging the legality of government cleanup plans should
receive different treatment from challenges by PRPs. In Cabot Corp. v.
E.P.A. 135 several PRPs attempted to use the citizen suit provision of section
310 to enjoin the implementation of a government cleanup plan. The PRPs
alleged, among other things, that the government had failed to limit cleanup
costs as required by CERCLA and the NCP. Although the court held that
section 113(h) barred pre-implementation challenges by PRPs concerned
with monetary relief, the court suggested that early review might be avail-
able for citizen suits focusing on health and environmental concerns. 136 In
131. Representative Roe stated, for example, that:
[w]hen the essence of a lawsuit involves contesting the liability of the plaintiff for
cleanup costs, the court should apply the other provisions of section 113(h),
which require such plaintiff to wait until the Government has filed a suit under
section 106 or 107 to seek review of the liability issue. The courts should not be
mislead by any effort to present such cases as legitimate "citizens' suits" chal-
lenging illegal action by the agency.
132 CONG. REc. H9600 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986); see 132 CONG. REC. S14,898 (daily ed. Oct. 3,
1986) (remarks of Senator Stafford indicating that courts must be able to draw appropriate
distinctions between PRPs and affected citizens).
132. See 132 CONG. REc. H9587 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (remarks of Representative
Florio).
133. Representative Glickman stated:
Clearly the conferees did not intend to allow any plaintiff, whether the neighbor
who is unhappy about the construction of a toxic waste incinerator in the neigh-
borhood, or the potentially responsible party who will have to pay for its con-
struction, to stop a cleanup by what would undoubtedly be a prolonged legal
battle. It was for this very reason that the conferees included section 113(h).
132 CONG. REC. H9583 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986). Representative Glickman did, however, state
that this result was based on the statutory provisions for effective public participation in the
government decisionmaking process. Id.
134. See 132 CONG. REC. S14,928-29 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (remarks of Senator Thur-
mond); 132 CONG. Rac. S14,917 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (remarks of Senator Mitchell).
135. 677 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
136. Considering the availability of citizens' suits to PRPs, the court stated:
Although PRPs are not in terms barred from bringing citizen suits, Congress'
decision to enable EPA to clean up hazardous waste sites prior to litigating the
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Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle Co. 137 the court also, in
dictum, suggested that citizens claiming environmental harm could chal-
lenge the adequacy of the government's cleanup plan through use of the citi-
zen suit provision of section 310.138 The court, without analysis, stated that
section 113(h)(4) provided an exception from the prohibition of judicial re-
view for citizen suits. 139
Two recent companion cases, however, hold that no pre-implementation
review of cleanup plans is available to citizens challenging the legality of the
government's decision. In Schalk v. Thomas 140 and Frey v. Thomas 14' the
plaintiffs challenged the development of a consent decree that EPA and
Westinghouse had entered into requiring Westinghouse to undertake a
cleanup of PCB contamination. The plaintiffs, asserting jurisdiction under
section 310, claimed that the government had failed to conduct an adequate
Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS), as required by CER-
CLA. The government moved to dismiss, claiming that the court did not
have jurisdiction due to the timing provisions of section 113(h). After an
extensive review of the legislative history, the court concluded that section
113 precludes a challenge of a government cleanup action until the action or
a discrete phase of the action has been completed. 42 The court dismissed
the court's statements in Cabot, referring to them as dictum and based on
only a partial review of the legislative history.143 Thus, since the plan had
not yet been implemented, the court dismissed the suits as premature. 144
In another recent case, Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v.
Reilly, 45 an association representing twenty-three residents living near a
Superfund site sought an injunction to prevent the start of a scheduled gov-
ernment cleanup of the site.' 46 The group challenged the adequacy of EPA's
remedial plan, claiming that if the plan went forward without further study,
it could pose a health hazard to residents living near the site. The group
presented evidence that the health assessment performed by the ATSDR was
inadequate and based on insufficient information.
allocation of the expenses of those cleanups supports a distinction between citi-
zen suits alleging irreparable hdrms and those claiming monetary damages.
Health and environmental hazards must be addressed as promptly as possible
rather than awaiting the completion of an inadequately protective response
action.
Id. at 829.
137. 659 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Del. 1987).
138. Id. at 1290 n.39.
139. Id.; see Chemical Waste Management v. EPA, 673 F. Supp. 1043 (D. Kan. 1987)
(court held that § 113(h) does not bar action by waste disposal company from challenging
EPA policy regarding qualification of its off-site facility to accept wastes from Superfund sites,
relying in part on distinction between company and PRPs in deciding whether § 113(h) ap-
plied to bar company from bringing its challenge).
140. 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1655 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
141. 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1660 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
142. Id. at 1664.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1665
145. 716 F. Supp. 828 (D.N.J. 1989).
146. The court noted that several residents had written to the court asking that the cleanup
be allowed to continue. Id. at 830.
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Looking to the legislative history, the court found that there was "some
support" for the argument that "mere formulation" of the Record of Deci-
sion constituted "action taken" within the meaning of section 113(h)(4). 147
The court concluded, however, there was "more support" for holding that
further action be taken before a citizen suit could proceed. 148 Significantly,
the court found that the plaintiffs had an adequate opportunity to be heard
because EPA had properly followed the notice and comment procedures re-
quired by section 117 of the Act.' 49
C. Resolving the Role of Citizen Suits in Challenges to Governmental
Cleanup Plans
The availability of pre-implementation challenges by citizens raises inter-
esting problems under CERCLA. Clearly, the existence of early judicial re-
view could act to delay cleanup of hazardous substances. Citizens can raise
challenges to hazardous waste cleanups for a variety of reasons, not all of
*which constitute legitimate challenges to the environmental adequacy of the
cleanup. For example, the omnipresent NIMBY ("Not in My Back Yard")
syndrome raises concerns that citizens may seek to block remedial plans that
call for transportation of wastes to sites near them.' 50 Nonetheless, experi-
ence with EPA suggests that the only effective constraint on government
decisionmaking is the availability of judicial review. Examples of EPA's
process of developing cleanup plans confirms this.' 5 ' Thus, the challenge of
interpreting the role of pre-implementation citizen challenges to EPA
cleanup plans lies in resolving the conflicting objectives of ensuring proper
cleanup plans by the government while not unduly delaying the cleanup of
hazardous waste sites.
This challenge is not insurmountable. Although much of the language,
legislative history, and case law is ambiguous, some things are clear. Con-
gress, in section 310, has indicated its intention to provide a role for citizen
"attorney general" actions under CERCLA. Interpretations of the statute
that restrict challenges of government cleanup plans until after implementa-
tion of the plan essentially eliminate any effective citizen role in the CER-
CLA cleanup process. In light of the ambiguity of the language and
legislative history, such a construction should be avoided. Second, Con-
gress, in section 113(h), has indicated that it wishes to avoid unnecessary
delay of cleanups.' 52 Third, distinctions between citizen suits by responsible
parties and other citizens are warranted. 53 PRPs can satisfy their concerns
with being held responsible for unnecessary costs of cleanups through post-
147. Id. at 833.
148. Id. at 834.
149. See infra notes 154-157 and accompanying text for a discussion of the possible signifi-
cance of the government's failure to provide an adequate opportunity for public participation
in allowing pre-implementation review by citizens.
150. See Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1554-60 (11th Cir. 1989).
151. See infra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 109-115 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
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cleanup challenges. Citizens challenges to the environmental adequacy of
cleanups cannot effectively be satisfied by post-cleanup litigation. The stat-
ute, however, can be interpreted to respond to all of these factors.
1. Limit Citizen Suits to Challenges for Failure to Perform
Nondiscretionary Duties
Section 310 authorizes citizen suits both to litigate whether a cleanup plan
adequately satisfies statutory requirements and to review the government's
failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty. Challenges to the adequacy of a
cleanup plan essentially involve claims that the government has improperly
exercised its discretionary authority under the statute. Given the concern
with preventing delays in the cleanup of hazardous waste sites, it is arguable
that neither PRPs nor citizens should be able to challenge government dis-
cretionary actions until after some stage of the cleanup is completed. In
such cases, the government has made its decision, however questionable, af-
ter following appropriate procedures and considering relevant criteria.
Challenges for failure to perform nondiscretionary duties, however, raise
other concerns. These challenges involve claims that the government has
not complied with mandatory requirements when making its decision. The
most important example of a challenge to a cleanup plan based on failure to
perform a nondiscretionary duty would involve a claim that the government
has failed to comply with statutory and regulatory requirements to ensure
proper public participation in the government decisionmaking process.1 54 In
such a case, courts should not defer to the government decision by restrict-
ing citizen suits to the post-implementation stage.
The legislative history supports this distinction. Representative Glickman
and others who argued for delaying citizen suits did so in part based on the
fact that the statute mitigates the need for pre-implementation citizen suits
through the statutory and regulatory requirements that EPA provide for
public participation in cleanup plan development and that EPA adequately
documents its final decision.' 55 This rationale fails, however, when EPA
neglects to implement properly the public participation requirement and de-
nies citizens a fair opportunity to provide meaningful comment on the pro-
posed plan. 156
154. Additionally, citizens may be able to claim that failure meaningfully to consider im-
plementation of a "permanent" solution, as required by section 121 of CERCLA, constitutes
violation of a nondiscretionary duty.
155. Representative Glickman stated:
the conferees decided to ensure expeditious cleanups by restricting such preim-
plementation review. To balance this restriction on judicial review of the rem-
edy selected by the EPA, the conferees included provisions that require EPA to
develop extensive procedures for public participation in the selection of the
cleanup plan and the compilation of an administrative record.
132 CONG. REc. H9583 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986).
156. Under the 1986 amendments, EPA issues its decision setting out the appropriate
cleanup remedy for a particular site in a Record of Decision (ROD). The Act requires EPA to
publish notice and a brief analysis of the proposed plan, make the plan available for public
review, and provide a "reasonable opportunity" for public comment. 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a)(1)
(1988). The notice and analysis must "include sufficient information as may be necessary to
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If no pre-implementation review were allowed, EPA could engage in a
perfunctory "notice and comment" procedure, and then proceed down
whichever road it chose without fear of judicial scrutiny until the remedy
was complete.157 The citizens would then be in a difficult, if not impossible,
position of asking a court to order EPA to redo the entire cleanup.
Limiting citizen suits to challenges to violations of nondiscretionary duties
would delay only those cleanups where the government's decision has lost its
claim to legitimacy by failing to comply with express statutory procedural
and substantive requirements. Citizen challenges to the exercise of govern-
ment discretion would wait until after the completion of a stage of cleanup.
This seems to reflect the deal that many in Congress opposing pre-implemen-
tation citizen suits believe was struck in sections 310 and 113(h).
2. Standards for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunctions Prevent
Unnecessary Delays in Implementation of Government Cleanup
Plans
If citizens are allowed to bring challenges to either discretionary or non-
discretionary government decisions, the courts have ample authority to pre-
vent unnecessary delays in implementation of hazardous waste cleanups.
Courts can simply refuse to issue an injunction halting the cleanup work and
let EPA proceed at its own risk with the cleanup. In order to obtain a pre-
liminary injunction, citizen plaintiffs would need to satisfy traditional equita-
ble principles for the grant of injunctive relief.15 8 Thus, they would have to
demonstrate, among other things, that they were "likely to prevail on the
merits" and that they would be "irreparably harmed" by failure to enjoin the
government's action.' 5 9 These traditional tests should assure that any mer-
itless challenges to a cleanup plan do not unduly delay the cleanup work. If
plaintiffs demonstrate that they are entitled to a preliminary injunction on
the grounds that the proposed cleanup does not meet the requirements of
CERCLA, then the government should not be proceeding with the cleanup.
No objective is served by allowing the government to proceed with a cleanup
in such a case.
provide a reasonable explanation of the proposed plan and alternative proposals considered."
Id. § 9617(a).
157. In Lopez v. Layton, No. DR-88-CA-25 (W.D. Tex. 1988), three residents have
brought a citizen suit action seeking to compel the EPA Region VI Administrator to fulfill
alleged mandatory duties regarding the cleanup of the Crystal City Airport Superfund site.
The plaintiffs also allege that they were denied adequate public participation, as required by
§ 117 of the Act. As of this writing, the parties were waiting for a ruling on the EPA's Motion
to Dismiss due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. EPA's motion is based on the timing of
review sections of § 113(h).
158. Case law under other environmental statutes suggests that courts have this discretion
in fashioning remedies to statutory violations. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S.
305 (1982).
159. In Weinberger the Court discussed the necessary prerequisites for injunctive relief:
"[ilt goes without saying that an injunction is an equitable remedy. It 'is not a remedy that
issues as of course.'.... The Court has repeatedly held that the basis for injunctive relief in the





The citizen suit provision of CERCLA may be largely devoid of sub-
stance. In only a few situations can citizens effectively compel or challenge
actions involving the cleanup of hazardous substances under CERCLA.
Although the provisions of other statutes and other provisions of CERCLA
in part remedy this failure, the citizen suit provision itself remains a largely
empty token to the role of citizens in enforcing environmental policy.
Citizen suits under CERCLA need not, however, be completely devoid of
content. Congress contemplated that citizens would have a role in supervis-
ing the adequacy of government cleanup decisions. The ambiguity in the
language and legislative history of section 310 requires courts to interpret
the statute in a manner that satisfies the clear congressional objectives of
both providing an effective role for citizen suits and minimizing unnecessary
delays in cleanup. It remains to be seen how courts will balance these com-
peting objectives. Through limitation of citizen suits to challenges of nondis-
cretionary duties and through use of their equitable authority to deny
preliminary injunctions, courts can successfully balance these objectives.
The significance of the citizen suit provision of CERCLA, and in some re-
spects, the adequacy of future cleanup plans depends on the resolution of
this issue.
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